Guarding the Gateways: Cybersecurity & Robocalls

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Cybersecurity Threat Landscape

- Adversaries target telecom networks: backbone, mobile switching, data centers
- Telecoms are attractive targets because they are both critical infrastructure and information hubs.
- Global cyber damages projected at \$23 trillion annually by 2027 (20% growth each year).¹
- Compliance consumes up to 70% of cyber resources, leaving less for actual defense.

STATE-BACKED **CYBERATTACKS** AGAINST THE U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR

¹ See The Economist, "Unexpectedly, the cost of big cyber-attacks is falling" (May 17, 2024).

² Chamber of Commerce, Briefing with Majority and Minority Staff of Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee (May 29, 2024).

When Hackers Knock, Regulators Answer

- Intrusions are no longer just IT problems they now trigger direct regulatory action. Providers are likely to see greater regulatory attention and evolving accountability standards.
- Some Congressional and recent FCC actions signal growing momentum to address telecom vulnerabilities with proposals focused on supply chain scrutiny, stronger network security requirements, and expanded regulatory oversight aimed at safeguarding critical communications infrastructure.

Hearing Date: April 2, 2025 10:00 am | HVC-210

Salt Typhoon: Securing America's Telecommunications from State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks

Subject Salt Typhoon: Securing America's Telecommunications from State-Sponsored Cyber Attacks

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Military and Foreign Affairs

CALEA Declaratory Ruling

- Former Chairwoman Rosenworcel issued a declaratory ruling citing CALEA Section 105 to argue for FCC authority over telecom cybersecurity.
- Like encroaching on private property without a warrant, ISPs could be held liable for "letting intruders in" digitally — meaning any cyber incident could expose providers to lawsuits.
- We (USTelecom & Industry Partners) are positioned to overturn or narrow the ruling through the current NPRM.



Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA)

- Without specific thresholds, companies may feel compelled to report too many events, flooding CISA with data and diverting resources from actual cyber defense.
- The current NPRM adds to an existing patchwork of federal, state, and sector-based reporting rules.
- Implementation should be collaborative. CISA should reciprocate by sharing timely defensive advisories and supporting incident response—not just receiving reports.
- Urgent need for ex parte communications or rescission of the 2024 proposed rule.

CIRCIA TIMELINE



March 2022 – Enactment

Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act signed into law.



2022-2023 – Initial Development

CISA gathers stakeholde input; issues Requests for Information



March 2024 – Proposed Rule Released

Draft rule defines reporting requirements, covered entities, and timelines



2024-2025 – Public Comment & Review

Industry provides feedback; CISA revises framework to address concerns



October 4, 2025 – Final Rule Expected

Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015

- Established a legal framework for voluntary cyber threat information sharing between industry and government, with liability protections to encourage cooperation.
- September 30th, 2025 sunset
- The CISA vs CISA 2015 dilemma
- Legislative vehicles for reauthorization
- Senate vs House draft text



When Every Call Feels Like a Scam


- Trust in voice networks is collapsing Americans receive 50+ billion robocalls annually, while fraud losses are still climbing 25–30% year-over-year.³
- Even when fraud originates with bad actors overseas or through shell companies, regulators and policymakers expect telcos to "clean it up."
- Fraudsters adapt faster than regulations.
- Regulatory pressure without technical feasibility increases liability risks.





From Spoof to Proof: STIR/SHAKEN

- STIR/SHAKEN was a major step forward in authenticating caller ID and reducing spoofed robocalls, but it does not cover non-IP networks or stop more targeted fraud tactics — leaving gaps that criminals continue to exploit.
- We recommend an interimly non-IP solution that meets TRACED Act requirements, leverages interim IP-based tools, aligns with network modernization transition to IP, and ensures compliance without diverting resources away from completing the full IP upgrade.



Evolving Threats, Persistent Gaps

- Fraudsters exploit overseas carriers beyond FCC jurisdiction; cross-border enforcement remains limited.
- Bad actors create disposable LLCs or impersonate legitimate carriers to slip through know-yourcustomer rules.
- Privacy and liability concerns limit collaboration between telecoms, banks, and tech platforms that could strengthen fraud prevention.



Closing the Loopholes

- Accelerate transition from TDM to IP to close authentication gaps.
- Expand traceback participation and resources to quickly identify upstream bad actors and disrupt scam networks.
- Emphasize to Lawmakers that real progress requires prosecution
- Congress should enable responsible data sharing across telecom, financial, and tech sectors to reduce legal barriers for joint fraud prevention efforts.



Thank you!

Feel free to reach out for any follow-up information by email: ALANE@USTELECOM.ORG